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Abstract 
This study focuses on the effect of gradual deregulation in a developing economy on the 
efficiency of banks and the banking sector. It assesses whether the policy package results 
in an improvement in the technical efficiency of the industry. This study adopts the data 
envelopment analysis (approach) that has been used to assess intertemporal changes in 
efficiency as well as the relative inefficiency of government controlled banks compared 
with private (new generation) banks. The study found that banking industry efficiency 
dec'ined significantly during the years immediately following the adoption of deregulation, 
with slight improvements noticed only in recent times. The study concludes that this 
may be the effect of inconsistent policies to which the sector was subjected during this 
period. 
I. Introduction and background 
As the prime movers of economic life, banks occupy a significant place in the economy 
of every nation. It is therefore not surprising that their operations are perhaps the most 
heavily regulated and supervised of all businesses (Soyibo and Adekanye, 1991). The 
importance of Nigerian banks is exemplified by their prominence in the structural 
adjustment programme (SAP) embarked upon by the nation in July 1986. Among other 
things banks were accredited as the only authorized dealers at the official segment of the 
multiple exchange that which have existed since the second-tier foreign exchange market 
(SFEM) was introduced. Also, the scope and coverage of their operations was seen as 
appropriate for the effective implementation of monetary policy and the intended reform. 
Through their financial intermediation function and the spread of bank branches, they 
were relied on to take result-oriented approach to export promotion and diversification 
and the revamping of industrial development and growth in Nigeria. The sectoral credit 
allocation policy, the National Economic Reconstruction Fund (NERFUNID), the Nigeria 
Export-Import Bank (NEXIM) and the African Development Bank's Export Stimulation 
Loan (ADBIESL) are among the endeavours to enhance the ability of banks to achieve 
the desired results for the overall benefit of the national economy. 
Policy makers, economists and monetary authorities recongnize that the ability of 
banks to achieve the desired results and to continue to play the role earmarked for them 
depends not only on the existence of an enabling (regulatory) environment and the number 
of operating banks (and perhaps the spread of bank branches) but more importantly on 
their performance from one financial year to the other. Quite obviously, the greater the 
number of operating banks that are resistant to adverse financial conditions, the better 
for monetary policy and ultimately the economy. The performance of banks attracts 
considerable attention from bank regulators and monetary authorities for this reason and 
also because of the adverse implications that bank failures would have public confidence 
in the banking system. This is why from country to country such classifications as 
problem/non-problem (Sinkey, 1 975a), failedlsurviving (Siems, 1992), financially 
successfullnon-financially successful (Arshadi and Lawrence, 1987) and vulnerable! 
resistant (Korobow and Stuhr, 1975; Hunter and Srinivasan, 1990; Adekanye, 1993) have 
been used to distinguish the performance of banks. In recent times, the monetary 
authorities in Nigeria have classified banks as healthy or distressed in an attempt to 
distinguish the performance of the country's banks. For the majority of the so-called 
distressed banks, some steps are taken to minimize the potential impact on the banking 
system and the economy of eventual failure though the primary desire is that they 
ultimately revert to sound health. 
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The financial deregulation' and liberalization policy came as a major component of 
the broad economic restructuring programme. In the early periods of the implementation 
of the programme and policy, many more banks, both merchant and commercial, gained 
entry into the sector. Ever since this period, other non-bank financial institutions such as 
finance companies, securities firms, community banks, the People's bank and lately 
mortgage banks, have become part of the financial system. Such specialized banks as 
NEXIM and the Urban Development Bank (UDB) have also commenced operations. 
However, to the extent that the conventional banks still hold the bulk of financial system 
deposits, provide the most appropriate channel through which monetary policy can be 
effectively conducted, coordinated, monitored and assessed, and serve as bankers to other 
financial institutions, they constitute, as in many other developed and developing 
economies, the most important group of financial institutions. By implication, therefore, 
they attract the greatest attention and, indeed, the most supervision. The myriad of 
guidelines and components of monetary policy directed at them in the form of interest 
rate ceilings, floors and maximum spreads, the prudential guidelines, paid-up capital 
enhancement, adherence to the international capital adequacy ratio prescribed by the 
Basle Committee, credit expansion ceilings, and directed credit guidelines, attest to the 
identified need for effective supervision deriving from the identified importance of these 
banks. Again, banking supervision ties in with the interest of monetary authorities in 
bank performance explained by the distinguishing performance classifications. 
While there have been claims that Nigerian banks have performed better since 
deregulation, some others have maintained that this applies only to private rather than 
public banks. The call for a divestment of government interest in Nigerian banks has 
been made in line with the policy thrust of the SAP Due essentially to bureaucracy and 
inefficiencies, the policy of privatization of government parastatals was incorporated 
into the economic restructuring programme to correct some of the distortions that 
characterized the economy and to aid effective resource allocation. From another 
perspective, it has been argued that continued government involvement in the ownership 
and operation of banks, especially the larger ones (which by their age account for about 
40% of the total assets of all banks), hindered their effective supervision thereby increasing 
the risk of failure and erosion of public confidence in the banking system. Adekanye 
(1993) pointed out that the very poor financial condition of National Bank of Nigeria 
had been evident since the early 1980s but the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) seemed to 
have hesitated to take prompt corrective action due to government's involvement in the 
bank. Government, it seems, had been reluctant to privatize the banks due to the perceived 
sensitive nature of the sector to the economy and the need to maintain visibility. Only 
recently has the attempt been made to privatize some of the banks, and only few a have 
been privatized so far. 
Bank performance, its determinants, classification and trends over the transition from 
a regulated to a deregulated economy, as well as the demands the transition makes on the 
supervisory authorities, requires greater attention. More than ever before, the preparedness 
and ability of the CBN to effectively supervise and conduct monetary policy in the resultant 
unprecedented expansion is under question. To live up to expectation, bank examiners, 
supervisors and policy makers require a more comprehensive understanding of the 
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performance characteristics of banks, the factors that determine their performance and 
the effect of deregulation on their performance. 
Justification and need for the study 
While there have been very many studies aimed at isolating the characteristics, behaviour 
and performance determinants of banks in developed countries, there are few that focus 
on developing countries of Africa, and indeed, in Nigeria. The behaviour of banks and 
the determinants of bank performance should be thoroughly investigated and appreciated 
for monetary policy effectiveness to be assured, for appropriate policy instruments to be 
designed and adopted, and for the all important banking supervision function of the 
CBN and other supervisory bodies such as the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(NDIC) to have the necessary impact. The importance of studies in this area cannot be 
overemphasized, especially at a time when (1) the banking sector has expanded 
considerably in both size and scope of operation without an obvious matching increase 
in supervisory resources, (2) it is believed the seemingly haphazard trial and error approach 
to policy formulation has jeopardized the ability of management of banks to effectively 
manage their asset and liability portfolios, and (3) when the impact of SAP on very many 
activities including those of banks and on the economy is not yet known. 
Adekanye (1993) represents a notable attempt to isolate the factors that distinguish 
vulnerable from resistant commercial banks in Nigeria. The study, which covered 1984 
to 1989 and adopted both multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA) and the logit 
regression technique, confirmed managerial efficiency to be the overriding determinant 
of commercial bank performance in Nigeria. Notwithstanding the illuminating evidence, 
the observed sample and other limitations of this study, policy developments since 1989, 
and the availability of more promising methodologies make further research not just 
desirable but imperative. 
The study concentrated on commercial banks and specifically the few that operated 
prior to the adoption of SAR As it covered only five of the seven years of deregulation, 
the study should not be relied on for policy formulation. Essentially relying on financial 
ratios, the study—like many others—used managerial efficiency as a proxy for management 
quality. As Siems (1992) pointed out, the single ratios measuring managerial efficiency 
such as operating income to operating expenses, suffer from several limitations. Though 
they may provide an overall measure of operational efficiency, they fail to indicate resource 
allocation and product decisions made by management because both the numerator and 
denominator are aggregate measures. Also, when a host of non-aggregated single input- 
output ratios are used to assess the myriad of decisions made by management, the ratios 
collectively represent a morass of numbers that give no clear evidence of efficiency of a 
bank (Siems, 1992; Sexton, 1986). One ratio may show that a bank is highly efficient 
while another displays a highly inefficient operation. Sexton maintains that such ambiguity 
makes ratio analyses ineffective in measuring true efficiency. 
Our study covers the investigation of efficiency as a measure of bank performance 
and includes more banks than Adekanye incorporated in his study, including the new 
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generation banks. Adekanye's survey of of bank managers revealed that many were of 
the view that batik failure is imminent and many of the new banks will be the first to fall 
victim. There is a consensus in the literature that management quality is the ultimate 
determinant of a bank's long-term survival (Cates, 1985; Pantallone and Platt, 1987; 
Homer, 1988; Seballos and Thompson, 1990; Siems, 1991). An interesting issue is the 
quality of the management of the new banks relative to the older and bigger banks and 
whether significant changes have took place in the transition to a deregulated economy. 
A similar analysis will provide a platform for assessing the nature of the inefficiency of 
public banks and perhaps form a basis in conjuction with other factors for prioritizing 
the privatization of these banks. Significant differences in efficiency between public and 
private banks, if they exist, can be established to further justify or refute the need for 
pnvatization of these banks. Furthermore, the time frame of the analysis provides a 
basis for investigating the impact of SAP on the performance (efficiency) of banks. 
Data envelopment analysis (DEA), an approach recently applied to the assessment of 
efficiency of banking institutions and the significance of management quality (measured 
quantitatively) as a determinant of bank performance (Siems, 1992; Yue, 1992), provides 
the framework within which the highlighted issues have been investigated. 
The appropriateness of the classification criteria adopted by the monetary authorities 
to distinguish the performance of banks and the consequences of such distinction have 
been examined and questioned (Sobodu, 1993a). The efficiency of these banks measured 
quantitatively could help to assess objectively the appropriateness of the criteria and 
perhaps also provide a basis for the modification of same. If this is achieved, the study 
would have contributed to policy formulation and would enhance significantly the 
supervisory procedures, resource allocation and capability of the authorities. 
The issues raised are of immense importance. The study provides a basis to investigate 
and evaluate the effect of SAP or, better still, the policy of financial deregulation on the 
management quality and efficiency of Nigerian banks. These issues have not been the 
focus in many of the studies. The DEA methodology has also not been applied to Nigerian 
banks. The increasingly complex nature of the banking system and the need to enhance 
the effectiveness of monetary policy and bank supervision in Nigeria make the study a 
desirable one. 
Objectives of the study 
The study has the following specific objectives: 
• To analyse the significance of changes in management quality and the efficiency of 
Nigerian banks between 1983 and 1993. 
• To measure the relative (in)efficiency of banks over time and across major categories, 
especially following deregulation in 1986. 
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• To assess the significance of the differences in tecimical efficiency between healthy 
and distressed banks (as to classified by the monetary authorities). 
• To evaluate the significance of the DEA quantitative measure of technical efficiency 
as a proxy for management quality. 
• To offer policy recommendations relating to the performance classification of Nigerian 
banks, the effect of deregulation on the efficiency of banks and the prospects for 
using efficiency measures to enhance banking supervision. 
As part of the first objective, we compare the management quality measure with the 
managerial efficiency (ratio) measure in relative terms among banks and for each bank 
over the study period. This combined with a (rank) correlation analysis of the measures 
of bank efficiency will provide for an assessment of the suitability of managerial efficiency 
ratios as a proxy for management quality. 
Policy recommendations that will be made are expected to aid the efficient allocation 
of supervisory resources and the resources of the Technical Committee on Privatisation 
and Commercialization (TCPC) now known as the Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE), 
among others, as well as to preserve and encourage a sound and competitive banking 
system. 
II. Bank performance related research: 
Empirical and methodological issues 
The stream of bank failures experienced in the United States of America (USA) during 
the 1940s prompted considerable attention to bank performance. The attention has grown 
ever since. The establishment of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) was 
also the outcome of the interest of policy makers in the performance of banks. There 
have been efforts to identify bank failures and develop early warning systems capable of 
signalling imminent failure of banks early enough to improve the chances of survival 
and to minimize the impact on the depositors, the banking system and the economy if 
and when failure occurs. Research efforts have equally covered the identification of 
characteristics of problem banks, predictors and predictions of bank failures, and analysis 
of determinants of bank performance. 
Performance classification has varied, with researchers' interests and banking systems 
reflecting why some studies used failed/non-failed classification as against vulnerable/ 
resistant classification. While some have represented ex post analysis, others have 
represented ex ante analysis. Following the definition or selection of appropriate 
performance criteria and categorization, financial ratios are often examined and analysed 
under groups reflecting different operating characteristics of banks. The popular categories 
include capital adequacy, asset quality, managerial efficiency (often used as a proxy for 
management quality), earnings (or profitability), and liquidity. Popular ratios for assessing 
capital adequacy include gross capital to total assets and gross capital to total loans. For 
asset quality, the ratios of total loans to total assets, loan loss provision to total loans and 
risk assets to total assets are commonly used. The ratios of operating income to operating 
expenses and operating expenses to total assets are commonly used to assess managerial 
efficiency. Profitability ratios include net income to total assets and net income to total 
capital, while for liquidity, total loans to total deposits and holding of government securities 
as a ratio of total assets are common. The list of ratios could indeed be endless. 
Apart from financial information (derived essentially from financial ratios), other 
factors describing economic conditions, local market structure, demographic conditions 
and capital market information have been incorporated into the analysis of bank 
performance. Pettway and Sinkey (1980) and Shick and Sherman (1980) and Simons 
and Cross (1991) found information on bond and stock price movements of quoted 
commercial banks to be significant indicators of bank performance. The Nigerian capital 
market is still underdeveloped and more than 90% of banks are not quoted on the stock 
exchange. Hence, market information will be of limited use to us in Nigeria as a 
determinant of bank performance. Fraser et al. (1974) found both demographic and 
market structure factors to be significant determinants of bank performance and economic 
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factors to be insignificant. The latter confirms the differences that may exist in the 
behaviour of banks across banking markets and different economies. The demographic 
factors defined by Fraser et al. included total population, urban-rural mix of the population 
and population density, while the economic factors were growth in aggregate bank 
deposits, taxable non-farm payrolls, urban population and retail sales respectively. 
Pantalone and Platt (1987) defined the economic factors as percentage change in 
disposable income, residential construction, unemployment and population and found 
some of them significant determinants of bank performance in an era of deregulation. 
A variety of methodologies are used to analyse bank performance. They include the 
CAMEL rating; univariate analysis (tests); multiple regression analysis; canonical 
correlation analysis; multivariate discriminant analysis (MDA); probit and logit 
techniques; survey approach and data envelopment analysis (DEA). We briefly highlight 
each of these approaches. 
The CAMEL rating 
The CAMEL rating is a scheme for grading the performance of banks by bank supervisors! 
examiners during on-site examinations. These on-site examinations are designed to 
identify problems in individual banks and to ensure banks' compliance with existing 
laws and regulations. The acronym derives from the five major dimensions of a bank's 
operation: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management quality, Earnings ability and 
Liquidity (CAMEL). Examiners score each of these factors as a single number from ito 
5, with 1 being the strongest rating, and develop an overall CAMEL rating from i to 5 
from the factor scores. As a rule of thumb, banks with a CAMEL rating of 4 or 5 are 
considered to be problem banks. The rating system is applied widely in the USA especially 
due to its simplicity and use by regulators, although it is often complemented with more 
rigorous analysis. 
Univariate analysis 
This has involved an assessment of the significance of individual financial ratios by a 
statistical test of differences in means of each ratio between the two performance 
categories. Where the difference in means is found significant, the ratio is deemed a 
determinant or distinguishing factor of bank performance. This approach was adopted 
by Sinkey (1975a), Korobow and Stuhr(i975), andAdekanye (1993). A major limitation 
of the approach is that it does not recognize the possibility of joint significance of financial 
ratios. The multivariate approaches correct for this limitation. 
Multiple regression analysis 
Meyer and Pifer (1970) adopted this approach. They defined the dependent variable in 
the equation as a binary choice variable with 0 representing a failed bank and i representing 
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a solvent bank. The explanatory variables are real variables and parameter estimates in 
the equation are OLS estimates. While they are still unbiased, they are not efficient. The 
usefulness of this technique, in spite of this limitation, is observed from the conclusion 
that for the two-group case, the analysis and results would be similar to MDA. It will 
prove inappropriate, however, for a multiple choice dependent variable. 
Multivariate discriminant analysis 
This is a popular technique in bank performance literature. MDA attempts to identify the 
linear combination of independent variables (financial ratios and other measurable or 
choice factors) that best discriminates/distinguishes between two or more performance 
classifications. MDA is used to weight and linearly combine the discriminating variables 
in some fashion so that groups are forced to be as statistically distinct as possible (Klecka, 
1990). The discnminant function, once obtained, can be used to predict the group to 
which cases with certain characteristics belong. The weights associated with each variable 
in the discriminant function indicate its relative importance. The higher the weight, the 
greater the associated variable's importance. Pettway and Sinkey (1980) and Adekanye 
(1993) used this technique. 
Canonical correlation analysis 
This method identifies linear combinations of independent variables that are most highly 
(or canonically) correlated with linear combinations of the dependent variables. The 
studies that have used this methodology (Fraser et al., 1974; Arshadi and Lawrence, 
1987) rely on more than one variable in defining performance. As Hunter and Srinivasan 
(1990) pointed out, the method precludes the explicit calculation of marginal value of 
independent variables on the dependent (choice) variable. Nor can the significance of 
individual explanatory factors be ascertained. 
Probit and logit analysis 
These methods of analysis are similar, differing essentially in the underlying distributional 
assumptions. While the probit technique is based on the cumulative normal distribution, 
the logit technique is based on the cumulative logistic probability function. The essence 
of the application of these techniques to bank performance is to estimate the chance that 
a non-sample bank will fall in a performance category given our knowledge of the 
characteristics of banks in each of the two categories. The probit model has been applied 
by Korobow, Stuhr and Martin (1976) and Hunter and Srinivasan (1990) while the Logit 
technique has been used by Martin (1977), Pantallone and Platt (1987) and Adekanye 
(1993). 
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Survey approach 
This represents a major component of Adekanye's study. Using a questionnaire directed 
at the management of a sample of Nigerian commercial banks, he was able to identify 
the factors that were believed to be major determinants of bank performance. These 
were essentially the components of the CAMEL acronym. In terms of importance, they 
were ranked as follows: managerial efficiency, asset quality, liquidity, capital adequacy 
and loan portfolio. The set of financial information rendered by the banks equally 
subjected to more rigorous analysis using the MDA and logit, and managerial efficiency 
came out as the most important factor. 
Data envelopment analysis (DEA) 
Graham and Homer (1988), in a study by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
in the USA, concluded that the difference between the failed banks and those that remained 
healthy or recovered from problems was the calibre of management. Developing a reliable 
quantitative measure to determine the quality of a bank's management has posed 
difficulties, however. 
The DEA is based on the application of economic production theory to the behaviour 
of a banking firm. This theory regards the bank as using a combination of inputs to 
produce one or more outputs. Essentially, banks are seen as attracting deposits and 
incurring interest expenses, salary expenses, premises and fixed assets as well as other 
non-interest expenses (as inputs) to generate loans and investments/earning assets and 
total interest income (as outputs). DEA computes a bank's efficiency in transforming 
inputs into outputs as a good measure of management quality. This efficiency measure 
of a bank's management quality is relative to the efficiency of its peers within the industry. 
The technique, based on linear programming, reflects the conversion of multiple inputs 
into multiple outputs and associates a scalar measure to reflect the efficiency in conversion. 
The conversion is accomplished by comparing the mix and volume of services provided 
and the resources used by each bank compared with all other banks. 
Siems (1992) applied DEA to assess the significance of management quality in 
distinguishing surviving from failed banks in the USA. Using a sample of 611 surviving 
banks and 319 failed banks, he showed that management quality is important for a bank's 
long-term survival. Yue (1992) applied the same technique to analyse the efficiency of 
60 Missouri banks for the period from 1984 to 1990. The methodology provided for the 
evaluation of the relative efficiency of different banks at the same time and the assessment 
of inter-temporal changes in the performance of individual banks. Other notable 
applications of the DEA to banking include Sherman and Gold (1985), Parkan (1987), 
Rangan el al (1988), Berg et al. (1989), Charnes et al. (1990), Aly et a!. (1990), Siems 
(1991), and Barr and Siems (1991a1b). Barr and Siems (1991b) demonstrate how the 
DEA efficiency scores can be incorporated as a variable in an early warning model. 
A major advantage of DEA that makes it attractive and adequate for developing country 
research is the minimal data requirement. It requires data only on inputs and outputs, 
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which are readily available from the annual reports of banks. No price data are required 
on inputs and outputs. Its limitation, however, is that it is sensitive to changes in the 
number of banks, inputs and outputs. 
This technique is deemed superior to single ratio analyses because the model allows 
the computation of efficiency by examining management's role in making resource 
allocation and product decisions. Regulators could use the bank management quality 
metric to identify the most inefficient banks that require greatest attention. DEA is 
discussed further below. 
Ill. The methodology 
As indicated earlier, this study relies heavily on the DEA approach to measuring relative 
efficiency among Nigerian banks. The theoretical expositions of Yue (1992) and Siems 
(1992) provide an excellent concise representation of the DEA methodology that can be 
easily appreciated and understood. 
Siems (1992) explained that DEA identifies the most efficient bank(s) in a population 
and provides a measure of inefficiency for all others relative to the most efficient bank. 
The most efficient bank(s) is(are) rated a score of 1 while the relatively less efficient 
ones are rated between 0 and 1. The technique is designed to measure relative efficiency 
using multiple inputs and outputs of banks with no a priori information about which 
particular inputs and outputs are most important in determining efficiency and thus the 
efficiency score. The relative efficiency of a bank is measured as the ratio of its total 
weighted output to its total weighted input. The weights used in measuring the weighted 
output and input, are determined endogenously in the DEA methodology. The weights, 
which are universal to all banks within the population of interest, represent those that 
maximize each bank's efficiency score; weights cannot be negative. By universal is 
meant that any bank should be able to use the same set of weights to evaluate its own 
efficiency ratio and the resulting ratio must not exceed one. The implication of this 
procedure is that, for each bank (or decision making unit, DMU), DEA will maximize 
the ratio of its (the bank's) own weighted output to its own weighted input. In general, 
higher weights will be associated with those inputs that a bank uses least as well as those 
outputs that it produces most. 
The mathematical representation of the basic DEA model is traceable to Charnes 
Cooper and Rhodes (1978) and is referred to as the CCR model. If n banks (as DMU5) 
convert the same m inputs into the same s outputs and the jth bank uses an m-dimensional 
input vector, (i=1 ,2 ,m), to produce an s-dimensional output vector, (r=1 ,2,...,s), 
and denoting the bank under evaluation by subscript o, the optimization problem solved 
for each bank is expressed as: 
Maximize h = I U.Y/I (1) 
r i 
subject to the constraints 
 forj=1,2,..,n (2) 
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Ur 0 forr=1,2,..,s (3) 
V0 fori=1,2,..,m (4) 
where Ur denote the output weights and Vi denote the input weights and both must be 
non-negative. 
The sum is referred to as the virtual (weighted) output and the virtual (weighted) 
input is defined as The objective function defined by h0 is the ratio of weighted 
output to weighted input, which is the relative efficiency ratio. The maximum of the 
objective function (h0*) is the DEA efficiency score assigned to bank o and the solution 
set is a set of optimal input and output weights. The first set of constraints Equation (1) 
guarantees that the efficiency ratios of other banks (computed by using the same weights 
Ur and are not greater than unity. The optimization problem is well defined for every 
bank since every bank can be bank o. The maximum value h0 can assume is 1. If this 
efficiency score is 1, bank o satisfies the necessary condition to be DEA efficient; 
otherwise, it is DEA inefficient. This implies that for any group of banks, one or more 
must be the most efficient (having efficiency score h0=l), while others (with efficiency 
score <1) will be relatively inefficient compared with the efficient ones. Furthermore, 
the efficiency scores make for a ranking of the banks in the population from the least 
efficient to the most efficient. While the most efficient bank(s) must (each) have an 
efficiency score of unity, the least efficient bank need not have a score of zero. 
The optimization problem reflected in equations 1 to 4 represents a linear fractional 
progranmiing problem that is difficult to solve. The non-linear problem, however, can 
be transformed into a linear problem that is easily solved using the standard simplex 
algorithms in linear programming. The linear progranmiing equivalent is expressed as: 
Maximize Y = I U. l'ro (5) 
r 
subject to the constraints 
1 (6) 
IUYd - 0 forj=1,2,..,n (7) 
Ur e for r=1,2,..,s (8) 
fori=1,2,..,m (9) 
where the subscript o represents the bank (DMU) being evaluated, denotes input i, 
denotes output r of bank j, and U,. and V1 represent the weights for outputs and inputs, 
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respectively. 
The linear programming problem has a dual for which purpose an arbitrary small 
positive number, E, is introduced to ensure that all of the observed inputs and outputs 
have positive values (or shadow prices) and that the optimal value of h0 is not affected by 
the values assigned to the so-called slack variables in the dual problem. The solution to 
the dual problem provides a framework for assessing the adjustment necessary for each 
inefficient bank to become efficient. By this we mean the amounts of inputs to be reduced 
and outputs to be increased to move the bank to the efficiency frontier. The weights in 
the primal solution provide information on the relative importance of inputs and outputs 
in the DEA evaluation of the efficiency of the population of banks. 
There is no limitation on how many banks can be considered in the DEA model. As 
mentioned earlier, however, the model scores (or assessment of relative efficiency) can 
be expected to be sensitive to the number (or population) of banks considered as well as 
to the number of inputs and outputs. Therefore, a bank may cease to be the most efficient 
with the introduction of a new bank into the population of banks. A change in the 
combination of inputs and inputs used in the model may also cause a most efficient bank 
to become relatively inefficient. The choice of inputs in the literature has largely been 
infonned by the model of the banking firm adopted. Yue's (1992) inputs were just four: 
interest expenses, non-interest expenses, transaction deposits and non-transaction deposits. 
The outputs were interest income, non-interest income and total loans. Siem's (1992) 
also included four inputs: number of full-time equivalent employees, salary expenses, 
value of premises and fixed assets, and other non-interest expenses. There are two final 
outputs, earning assets and total interest income. Siems's framework sees deposits as 
intermediate inputs while Yue's considers them as primary inputs. The literature, however, 
does not provide a basis for assessing the sensitivity of the DEA methodology to the 
different models, and perhaps therefore for choosing which is more appropriate. One 
factor that may help to detennine the specific types and number of inputs and outputs 
appropriate for an application to Nigerian banks is the degree of comprehensiveness and 
consistency in information reported by banks over the study horizon. 
IV. The Nigerian banking sector pre and 
during sap 
The banking sector pre-SAP 
The Nigerian banking sector witnessed serious problems that led to mass failure of banks 
in the early 1950s. The failed banks consisted then of many private initiatives that had 
adopted over zealous credit expansion policies in an attempt to increase what was observed 
as restricted access to credit by existing foreign banks. The latter years of the 1960s 
witnessed the gradual return of normalcy and an attempt to forestall more failures by the 
introduction of basic regulatory policies to ensure that banks were adequately capitalized 
and liquid and that they expanded moderately in their credit portfolio. Cash reserve 
ratios were introduced and so were adjusted capital ratios. Banks operated in a market in 
which prices were dictated by the regulatory authority. There was little or no need for 
competition as many banks were very comfortable, with profit positions largely made 
without effort. The level of capital in retrospect was equally sufficiently low, having 
little or no bearing to the changing structure of banks' assets and by implication the 
riskiness of banks' assets. The policy environment was largely stable, with occasional 
changes in details of specific regulatory ratios and rarely such major policy redirection 
as was observed with the adoption of SAP and the trial and error approach that has 
accompanied its implementation. Policy stability enhanced the stability of bank 
performance also. There were no clear guidelines on identification of weak and low 
quality assets nor was there any uniform method among banks for making provision for 
these assets. These of course brought about non-recognition of same by the industry, 
leading to false profit levels and acutely inadequate capital to serve as cushion in the 
event assets crystallized. 
Some recent developments in the Nigerian banking 
sector 
With the adoption of SAP the regulatory framework guiding the operations of banks 
changed. Steps were taken to liberalize interest and lending rates. Many more banks 
were allowed entry into the sector. Competition increased a great deal among banks and 
the face of the industry changed within a few years. At different times ceilings on interest 
rates were removed, replaced and then removed again. In 1994, the ceilings and floors 
on interest rates were again restored. Regulatory authorities took steps to correct some 
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of the endemic afflictions of banks that were carrying poor quality assets and had little 
cushion for it. Capital adequacy, liquidity and credit restrictions were enhanced to forestall 
the possibility of continuous deterioration in the health of the critically affected banks. 
Meanwhile, the newer banks developed new products and created various opportunities 
for exploiting profit. They grew in profits by leaps and bounds, though industry watchers 
claim the bulk of their profits is accounted for by their undue emphasis on foreign exchange 
trade and the sharp practices in which they engaged. This coupled with the continued 
depreciation of the naira since the inception of SFEM has led to a seemingly unending 
search for the ideal market mechanism for allocating scarce foreign exchange. The new 
era has also seen an unprecedented level of fiscal indiscipline on the part of government, 
a recurring feature that has made liquidity management in the sector an uphill task. 
The period 1990 to 1992 was an interesting one in our experience of deregulation of 
the Nigerian economy and the financial system. The year 1990 in particular is noted for 
the very bold and decisive steps taken by the monetary authorities to monitor and safeguard 
the quality of assets of the banking industry as well as ensure that the sector was adequately 
capitalized, thus promoting safety and soundness of the system. It is clear from theory 
what devastating effects the poor quality of banking system assets and disproportionate 
exposure coupled with a thin cushion for losses could do to the system. Beyond the 
erosion of public confidence, which should be enough to put monetary authorities and 
policy makers on guard, there is the effect of the creation of considerable leakages, which 
will then undermine the efficacy of monetary policy. To this end, prudential guidelines 
were introduced that were to be immediately applied by all banks. These policy guidelines 
specified unambiguous steps that banks should take to recognize and fully provide for 
their non performing assets. Aside from ensuring that bank profits were real cash profits, 
it was meant to make for uniformity within the system and meaningful comparison among 
banks. 
Added to the prudential guidelines was the increase in the minimum paid-up capital 
of commercial banks to N50 million from N30 million and from N20 million for merchant 
banks to N40 million. To complement this capital requirement, the newly prescribed 
international capital adequacy ratio was adopted. This international capital requirement 
maintains that the ratio of each bank's adjusted capital to its risk weighted assets be set at 
a minimum of 8%. A transition period ending in 1991 was allowed, within which banks 
were required to maintain the ratio at a minimum of 7.25%. 
In 1991, ceilings on interest rates were removed for the second time, though a floor 
was imposed on deposit rates. Banks were allowed to earn a spread of 5% between their 
average cost of funds and their prime lending rate. Depositors and borrowers were free 
to negotiate and agree on applicable rates subject to a minimum of 13.5% p.a. on deposit 
accounts. With the influx of non-bank financial institutions, which have continued since 
mid 1990, competition drove interest rates very high. The liquidity mop-up exercise of 
the Apex bank also contributed a great deal to the prevailing rates. Beginning with the 
last quarter of 1991, credit expansion ceilings were removed with the introduction of the 
healthy/distressed classification of operating banks by the Apex bank. Only healthy 
banks, going by the criteria employed by the monetary authorities, used the policy change. 
Distressed banks still had to obey ceilings that hitherto had been general. 
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This development coupled with the signs of default that had begun to emerge in the 
non-bank financial institutions sub sector gingered the consciousness of the public. The 
classification has thus continued to be used as a yardstick till today by bank customers 
and the public, though little is known about which banks are actually distressed and 
which are healthy, except for glaring cases such as National Bank of Nigeria and a few 
other government-owned banks. 
With each passing year, naira devaluation continued under the float mechanism adopted 
for exchange rate determination. Though the foreign exchange market remained largely 
liberalized, the rules of allocation changed from time to time. Due to the arbitrage 
opportunities that remained a permanent feature of the exchange markets, banks have 
understandably developed an insatiable appetite to participate in the market, which has 
unwittingly constituted a key source of considerable non-interest income for them. On 
5, March 1992, the monetary authorities implemented an 80% depreciation of the naira 
and have kept the rate largely "fixed" or "stable" ever since. The market has nevertheless 
remained a source of non-interest income for banks. 
The crises of non-repayment of depositors' funds at maturity and inter-finance house 
placements affected on the inter-bank money market. Since the closing months of 1992, 
activity in the market has gradually reduced and was at a standstill over the greater part 
of 1993. Essentially, signs of distress in the system had begun to appear in 1992. 
Finally, more visible efforts were made to privatize all the 12 wholly owned federal 
government banks. The sales did not, however, hit the market until 1993. Some of the 
state-owned banks also attracted great attention from the regulatory and supervisory 
authorities due to their deteriorating state of ill-health. 
V. Empirical analysis of bank performance 
and efficiency: 1983-1993 
Sample selection and characteristics 
The sample comprises mainly Nigerian commercial banks that operated at any time within 
the 11- year study period covering 1983 to 1993. The sample comprises 20 banks in 
each of the years prior to SAP and about 35 since SAP. The choice of banks was largely 
informed by the availability of data and the need to base our analysis, as much as possible, 
on a consistent and uniform sample. To enhance intertemporal comparison of efficiency 
of each bank and across banks, we pooled the entire sample of banks over the period. In 
this regard, we may therefore view the sample for the study horizon as consisting of a 
total of 278 commercial banks. We have limited the scope of the study by focusing only 
on commercial banks, thus excluding merchant banks, in view of the significant differences 
in the regulatory requirements guiding their operations. For example, merchant banks 
are expected to hold a greater proportion of longer-term assets than commercial banks. 
The implications for pricing and earnings would therefore be different across the categories 
of banks. In addition, their funding base is necessarily constrained by the limitation 
imposed on them regarding branching and minimum account opening balance. Merchant 
banks tend to have much higher average deposit costs than commercial banks. These 
factors by their very implications suggest that comparison between the two categories of 
banks would not be meaningful. 
The sample of banks comprises old and new banks, private and government-owned 
banks, and they vary in size and capital adequacy. Private banks are defined as those 
without any government equity participation or that are newly privatized. There are federal 
government banks and state government banks. The former group are those in which the 
federal government has more than 25% in equity and the state banks are those in which 
one or more states account for more than 25% of the equity. Reference to government 
owned banks in this study implies the collection of federal and state government banks. 
As can be observed from Table 1, private sector participation in the banking sector has 
been on the increase. In 1983, 85% of operating commercial banks were either federal or 
state government controlled and only 15% featured substantial private sector involvement. 
Since the adoption of SAP, the proportion of private banks has been on the increase. In 
1987, government controlled banks had declined in proportion to 75%. By 1993, of the 
sample banks, 18% were federal government controlled compared with 82% controlled 
by the private sector. This is of course consistent with entry liberalization into the sector 
brought about by the SAP. 
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Table 1: Distribution of sample banks by selected characteristics (%) 
Capital adequacy Profitability Asset size Ownership 





1983 60 40 80 20 50 50 15 85 
1984 60 40 87 13 52 48 22 78 
1985 65 35 82 18 52 48 22 78 
1986 54 46 71 29 50 50 25 75 
1987 52 48 80 20 36 64 24 76 
1988 50 50 67 33 17 83 25 75 
1989 32 68 52 47 38 62 32 68 
1990 20 80 45 55 45 55 50 50 
1991 25 74 48 52 18 81 52 48 
1992 17 83 33 67 7 93 60 40 
1993 17 82 29 71 4 96 82 18 
Some characteristics of Nigerian commercial banks: 
1983-1993 
The structural adjustment programme (SAP) was adopted in July 1986. We therefore 
refer to the period 1983 to 1986 as the pre-SAP period and 1987 to 1993 as the SAP 
period. The return on assets (ROA) of Nigerian commercial banks averaged 1.15% over 
the pre-SAP period compared with 2.36% during SAP. Table 2 confirms that there has 
been a significant jump in the profitability of banks during the era of SAP. From Table 3 
we observe a somewhat stable level of profitability between 1983 and 1985. From an 
ROAof 1.05% in 1985, ajump to 1.56% was recorded in 1986 and this trend appears to 
have been maintained. The very recent years of 1992 and 1993 with ROA of 3.14% and 
4.21% respectively, show particularly impressive industry profitability. 
The average cost of deposits also distinguishes banks between pre-SAP and SAP 
periods. An average cost of 4.07% was recorded for banks before SAP compared with 
9.76% over the SAP period. This is not surprising when it is borne in mind that the 
deregulation of interest rates was first implemented in 1987. The policy was rescinded 
after that year and later reintroduced in 1991. We see from Table 3 a consistent increase 
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Table 2: Results of t-test of differences in selected financial ratios pre and during SAP 
S/N. Financial ratios 1983-1 993 Pre-SAP SAP 
1. Return on asset1 1.96 1.15 2.36 
2. Return on equity 23.56 16.86 42.76 
3. Avg. cost of deposit1 7.92 4.07 9.76 
4. Loan to asset1 31.02 40.93 26.29 
5. L.loss provision! total loans1 5.35 2.28 6.80 
6. Capital to asset 6.32 5.78 6.57 
7. Capital to loan3 32.18 24.68 35.76 
8. Loan to deposit1 43.68 53.64 38.92 
9. Liquid asset to total asset1 51.91 44.51 55.45 
10. Op. expense/operating income 78.86 82.66 77.04 
11. Op. expense/total asset 1 6.05 4.29 6.89 
12. Fixed asset/total asset1 3.74 2.64 4.27 
13. Earning asset/total asset1 84.91 87.52 83.65 
14. Capital to earning assets2 7.56 6.77 7.95 
15. Gross earnings/earning assets1 15.99 9.71 19.02 
16. Gross earnings/total assets1 13.32 8.47 15.64 
17. Fixed asset/capital 72.52 64.94 76.16 
18. Return on earning assets1 2.36 1.32 2.85 
Ratios are presented in percentages (%). 
1 signifies that the ratio has significantly different 
means between the pre-SAP and SAP periods. 
in average funding cost from 1987 to 1990. The trend has remained after a temporary 
drop between 1990 and 1991. 
The asset structure of commercial banks have also changed significantly since the 
introduction of SAP As a proportion of total assets, loans and advances have reduced 
markedly from an average of 40.9% pre-SAP to 26.3% during the SAP period. Cash and 
short-term funds as a proportion of total assets have increased from an average of 44.5% 
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ratio of deposits from 53.6% pre-SAP to 38.9% during SAP. banks' fixed 
assets as a proportion of total assets has increased significantly from 2.64% to 4.27%. 
We deduce from this trend that as measures of liquidity, loan to asset, loan to deposit and 
the liquid asset ratios suggest significant shifts in asset structure and indeed, in liquidity. 
Banks have become more liquid with deregulation, though an average higher but affordable 
proportion of their total assets is now accounted for by fixed assets. Many of the new 
entrants are known to have acquired fixed assets especially in a bid to remain 
technologically relevant in the increasingly competitive environment. While this trend 
is understandable, what appears worrisome is the fact that as a proportion of bank's 
capital, fixed assets averaged 76.2% during the SAP era compared with about 65% over 
the pre-SAP era. This fear is further corroborated by the significant decline in the 
proportion of banks' earning assets from 87.5% pre-SAP to 83.7% in the SAP era. 
Whereas the assets of banks in nominal terms have grown significantly overtime, the 
shift in structure away from the traditional loans toward liquid assets has been accompanied 
by a significant jump in loan loss provision as a ratio of total loans. The ratio jumped 
from an average of 2.3% pre-SAP to 6.8% during SAP as can be seen from Table 2. A 
number of regulatory prescriptions have informed the increase in capital to loan and 
capital to asset ratio. The former has increased to 35.8% during SAP from 24.7% pre- 
SAP while the latter has increased to 6.6% during the SAP from 5.8% pre-SAP. The 
minimum authorized and fully paid-up share capital of commercial banks has been 
increased twice since the SAP period. 
Size characteristics 
For the purpose of isolating the relationship between a bank's size and its efficiency we 
categorized banks into two groups on the basis of their asset size. In the literature, asset 
and/or deposit base of banks have been adopted as proxy for their size. At times their 
market share of assets and/or deposit have also been used. The second set of measures, 
however, follows from the first. One set of banks have asset size below N500 million 
while the other size post at least a balance sheet figure of N500 million in assets. The 
choice is informed by the need to avoid a concentration of banks in any period since to a 
large extent the large and growing sizes of banks have been accelerated by the naira 
depreciation and high and rising inflation rate since SAP. 
From Table 4, it is clear that the classification adopted significantly distinguishes at 
5% level banks with assets below N500 million from those that are larger. Indeed, of the 
278 banks in the sample, 89 had assets below N500 million and 189 posted balance sheet 
figures in excess of this amount. The profitability of the bigger banks is also significantly 
higher than that of the smaller banks when their ROAs of 2.2% and 1.5%, respectively, 
are compared. The average funding cost of bigger banks is higher at 8.7% than that of 
smaller banks at 6.3%. The average funding cost differs between the categories of banks 
as exemplified by the statistical significance of this variable at 5% level. Bigger banks 
also have higher loan loss proportions at 6.5% compared with only 3.0% on the average 
for smaller banks. By way of asset structure, however, both categories of banks would 
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Table 4: Bank size - results oft-test of differences in selected financial ratios pre and during 
SAP 
Pre-SAP SAP 
S/N Fincial ratios <N500 m >N500m 
<N500m > N500m <N500 m > N500m 
1. No.of Banks 46 44 43 145 89 189 
2. Asset 241.9 2001.81 328.0 355771 283.5 3195.51 
3. Deposit 183.6 1616.12 221.5 2271.51 209.5 2118.91 
4. Return on Asset 0.7 1.61 2.2 2.41 1.5 2.21 
5. REturn on Equity 14.8 19.0 22.0 -16.9 18.2 -43.1 
6. Avg. cost of Deposit 3.7 44l 9.0 10.01 6.3 8.71 
7. Loan-to-Asset 39.5 4241 25.3 26.61 32.7 30.3 
8. L.Loss Provision 1.2 4.8 741 3.0 6.51 
Total Loans 
9. Capital-to-Asset 7.1 441 8.2 6.11 7.7 571 
10. Capital-to-Loan 34.6 14.3 56.2 29.71 45.1 26.12 
11. Loan-to-Deposit 52.7 5461 39.1 3891 46.1 42.5 
12. LiquidAsset-to- 47.2 41.61 58.9 54•41 52.9 51.4 
Total Asset 
13. Op.Expense/ 91.6 73.3 73.2 78.2 82.7 77.1 
Operating Income 
14. Op.Expense/ 4.2 431 5.9 7.21 5.1 6.51 
Total Asset 
15. Fixed Assetl 2.8 2.41 4.2 431 35 3.8 
Total Asset 
16. Earning Asseti 
Total asset 7.8 9.21 14.2 16.51 10.9 14.41 
17. Capital -to- 53.4 76.9 50.0 84.0 51.8 82.31 
Earning Assets 
18. Gross Earningsl 87.5 87.6 85.1 83.2 86.3 84.22 
Earning Assets 
19. Gross Earningsl 8.4 5.0 9.8 7.4 9.1 6.81 
Total Assets 
20. Fixed Asset! 8.9 10.5 17.1 19.6 12.9 17.51 
Capital 
21. Return on Earning 0.8 1.81 2.7 2.91 1.7 2.71 
Assets 
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appear to have similar structures going by the loan to asset and liquid asset ratios that 
show no statistical significance. With respect to capital adequacy, the statistical 
significance of capital to asset and capital to loan ratios respectively suggests that smaller 
banks are better capitalized than bigger banks. Whereas the capital to loan ratio for 
smaller banks averaged 45.1%, for bigger banks it averaged 26.1%. 
Bank profitability 
It is widely accepted that a profitable bank is one whose ROA is at least 2% while less 
profitable ones are those with lower ROA. Some studies have also assumed a benchmark 
of 1.5%. We have categorized bank profitability on the basis of a 2% ROA. We find 
from our sample that this benchmark distinguishes banks by profitability. For example, 
Table 5 confirms the significance of ROA at 5% level. Deposit size differs significantly 
at 10% level between profitable and less profitable banks as can also be observed from 
Table 5. Indeed, from this conclusion it can be seen that less profitable banks have 
higher average deposit levels than profitable ones. Other factors that distinguish profitable 
from less profitable banks include average funding cost, which is higher for profitable 
banks, asset structure, asset quality, capital adequacy and managerial efficiency. On 
asset structure, we observe a statistically significant difference in the loan to asset and 
loan to deposit ratios between the two classes of banks. The more profitable banks have 
a lower proportion of loans on the average at 24% when compared with less profitable 
banks at 35.8%. Also, as a proportion of deposit, loans averaged 48.5% for less profitable 
banks when compared with 36.5% for profitable ones. In respect of asset quality, as 
expected, less profitable banks have a significantly higher loan loss proportion when 
compared with profitable banks. 
Popular ratio analyses used to assess manageriallmanagement efficiency include the 
ratios of operating expense to operating income and operating expense to total assets, 
among others. Our comparative analysis reveals that operating expense to operating 
income ratio for less profitable banks is significantly higher than that for profitable banks. 
For every naira income, less profitable banks expend 94.1 kobo on the average while 
profitable ones spend an averagge of only 56.2 kobo. 
Finally, from the statistical significance at 5% level of the capital to loan and capital 
to asset ratios, we confirm that profitable banks have a greater capital cushion for loan 
losses and assets. 
Bank capitalization 
Table 6 also confirms our conclusion on the higher capital cushion offered by more 
profitable banks in that banks with capital to asset ratios in excess of 5% are more profitable 
than those with lower ratios. Average funding cost, at 8.7%, is significantly higher for 
banks with capital ratios in excess of 5%, compared with 6.8% for banks with lower 
capital ratios. Significant differences exist between the asset structures of these sets of 
banks. The average ratio of loan to deposit and loan to asset is in both cases significantly 
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Table 5: Bank profitability: Results of t-tests of differences in selected financial ratios 
pre and during SAP 
Pre-SAP 
S/N Financial ratios 
SAP 
ROA <2% ROA > 2% 
ROA<2% ROA>=2% ROA<2 ROA>2% 
1. No.of banks 72 18 94 94 116 112 
2. Asset 1087.4 1162.11 3654.7 1983.22 2541.2 
3. Deposit 864.3 962.51 2356.9 1248.2 1709.5 1202.32 
4. Return on asset 0.7 3.0 0.3 4•31 0.5 4.21 
5. Return on equity 12.1 36.0 -128.5 43.0 -67.6 41.9 
6. Avg. cost of deposit 4.2 351 7.9 11.61 6.3 10.31 
7. Loan to asset 42.8 33.61 30.5 22.11 35.8 24.01 
8. L.loss provision! 2.3 2.11 8.9 4.81 6.0 432 
total loans 
9. Capital to asset 5.6 6.5 5.4 7.7 5.5 7.5 
10. Capital to loan 22.3 34.1 31.0 41.3 26.8 40.2 
11. Loan to deposit 56.3 43.V 42.6 35•32 48.5 36.51 
12. Liquid asset to 43.0 50.61 51.1 59.82 47.6 58.3 
total asset 
13.Op. expense! 94.0 37.2 94.2 59.9 94.1 56.21 
operating income 
14. Op. expense 4.6 3.21 7.4 6.41 6.2 5.9 
total asset 
15. Fixed assetl 2.7 2.21 4.2 431 3.6 4.0 
total asset 
16. Earning asset] 8.3 9.01 13.2 18.01 11.1 16.61 
total asset 
17. Capital to earning 6.5 7.7 6.7 9.2 6.6 9.01 
assets 
18.Gross earnings! 9.5 10.41 16.5 21.51 13.5 19.71 
earning assets 
19. Gross earnings! 87.6 87.41 82.5 84.8 84.7 85.2 
total assets 
20. Fixed asset/capital 73.0 93.5 59.11 84.5 54.5 
21.Returnon 0.8 3.6 0.5 5.11 0.6 591 
earning assets 
1 signifies that the means of the ratio significantly differ at 5% between profitability classes. 
2 signifies that the means of the ratio significantly differ at bob between profitability classes. 
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higher for less capitalized banks than for well capitalized ones. This observation, compared 
with the significantly higher ratio of cash and short-term assets to total assets for banks 
with capital ratios in excess of the 5% benchmark, indicates that banks in this group are 
more liquid on average than banks in the other group. As with efficiency, banks with 
Table 6: Capitalisation: Results of West of differences in selected financial ratios pre and 
during SAP 
<50% >50% Capital Ratio 
S/N. Financial Ratios 
Pre-SAP SAP Pre-Sap SAP <5% >5% 
1. Return on asset 1.2% 0.5% 1.1% 31% 0.87% 0.6% 
2. Return on equity 21 .91% 204.7% 9.3% 27.7% 94.46% 23.7% 
3. Avg. cost of 4.5% 9.0% 3.4% 10.1% 6.8% 8.7% 
Depost 
4. Loan to asset 39.0% 29.3% 43.8% 24.9% 34.1% 29.0% 
5. L.Loss provision 2.9% 8.2% 1.3% 6.2% 5.6% 5.2% 
total loans 
6. Capital to asset 3.5% 3.0% 9.2% 8.1% 3.2% 8.4% 
7. Caital to loan 12.9% 15.9% 42.4% 44.4% 14.4% 43.9% 
8. Loan to deposit 52.8% 41.6% 54.9% 37.8% 47.0% 41.5% 
9. Liquid asset to 42.9% 49.8% 46.9% 57.9% 46.4% 55.5% 
total asset 
10. Op.expense/ 77.5% 92.4% 90.4% 70.4% 85.2% 74.7% 
operating income 
11. Op.expense/ 4.7% 6.9% 4.4% 6.9% 5.6% 6.4% 
total asset 
12. Fixed assetl 2.4% 3.6% 3.1% 4.6% 3.0% 4.3% 
total asset 
13. Earning asset/ 8.6% 13.4% 8.2% 16.5% 11.1% 14.8% 
total asset 
14. Capital-to- 83.1% 116.4% 37.7% 59.0% 100.0% 54.3% 
earning assets 
15. Gross earnings/ 87.2% 81.2% 88.1% 84.7% 84.1% 85.4% 
earning assets 
16. Grossearnings/ 4.1% 3.8% 10.8% 9.7% 3.9% 10.0% 
total assets 
17. Fixed assetl 9.9% 17.0% 9.3% 19.9% 13.6% 17.6% 
capital 
18. Return on 1.4% 0.9% 1.2% 3.7% 1.1% 3.2% 
earning assets 
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higher capital ratios are more managerially efficient going by the significance of the 
operating expense to operating income and operating expense to total assets ratios. 
Ownership characteristics 
We earlier distinguished between private and government banks. This distinction provides 
for an interesting investigation into the widely held belief that private banks are usually 
more efficient than government banks and also that by adopting a market driven economy 
and simultaneously divesting govermnent equity in the sector, the efficiency of the banks 
can be enhanced and by implication that of the entire sector. From Table 7, profitability, 
average funding cost, loan to asset ratio, capital to loan ratio and loan to deposit ratio 
differ significantly between private and public banks. These banks do not differ in size. 
Not surprisingly, private banks are observed to be significantly more profitable than 
government banks. While the ROA for private banks averaged 3.3%, that for government 
banks averaged 1.1%. Private banks have a higher average funding cost at 10.5% than 
do government banks, which averaged only 6.3%. This may not be unconnected with the 
age advantage of the majority of government banks as well as the privilege enjoyed at 
least until 1989 when patronage of govermnent owned banks by government parastatals 
was virtually mandatory and the banks' access to cheap and stable funds was greatly 
enhanced. Even the states and their parastatals till this day patronize banks in which 
they have reasonable levels of equity. 
Private banks appear to be better capitalized than public banks. The age factor may 
also be responsible for this. Prior to SAP, the capital position of existing banks, most of 
which were government owned, was very low. This persisted until the early years of SAP 
after which they were also mandated by the introduction of the prudential guidelines to 
make huge provisions for the suspect quality of assets they carried. The newer private 
banks on their part had relatively cleaner asset portfolios at the time the prudential 
guidelines were introduced in addition to the fact that for most, within the first few years 
of entry into the sector, they were expected to enhance significantly their capital positions 
more than twice. 
The significantly higher values of the loan to asset and loan to deposit ratios for 
government banks reveal that private banks are more liquid and that the asset structures 
of the categories of banks are different. 
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No. of banks 
Asset 
Return on asset 1.5% 
Return of equity 24.8% 
Avg. cost of deposit 4.3% 
Loan-to-asset 28.1% 
L.Loss provision! 
total loans 4.8% 
Capital-tro-asset 4.6% 
Capital-to loan 31.1% 
Loan-to-deposit 40.8% 
Liquid asset-to- 
total asset 50.9% 
Op. expense! 
operating income 93.9% 
Op. expense! 

































1.2% 4.1% 2.1% 4.0%1 3.6% 4.6% 
7.6% 17.8% 9.1% 12.9%1 8.4% 14.2%1 
31.8% 64.8% 40.8% 88.6%1 95.3% 85.4% 
90.9% 84.5% 86.8% 82.1% 86.5% 83.3% 
5.1% 8.5% 5.8% 6.3% 81.5% 8.0% 







earning assets 1.7% 4.3% 2.1% 1.2%1 0.7% 1.7% 3.8% 1.4% 
Table 7: Bank ownership - Results of t-tests of differences in selected fiancial ratios pre 
and during SAP 
Private Federal Govt State Govt Ownership 
Financial Ratios 
Pre-SAP SAP Pre-SAP SAP Pre-SAP SAP Private Public 
Fed & St 
Deposit 478.1 1666.9 
19 88 28 32 43 68 107 171 
637.2 2820.7 2376.7 6560.61 478.0 1060.6 2432.9 21.56.9 
1455 1536.1 1926.7 4329.91 384.2 759.21 
1.8% 1.1% 0.6% 1.2% 
20.5% 9.2%1 11.0% 174% 
4.5% 7.0% 3.7% 8.4% 
38.8% 29.4% 48.0% 30.7% 
2.3% 8.2%1 1.2% 6.8%1 
4.9% 5.2% 6.8% 6.4% 
13.2% 19.4%1 29.4% 37.8% 
50.9% 40.0%1 61.1% 
59.6% 50.9% 51.1% 37.5% 52.1%1 
65.9% 69.4% 85.3%1 86.3% 87.6% 
6.7%% 4.1% 6.8%1 4.9% 7.2% 
VI. Data envelopment analysis of the 
efficiency of Nigerian banks 
The methodology of DEA was detailed in Section III. The methodology based on the 
input-output concept identifies within a population the most efficient banks and for every 
bank provides a measure of the relative inefficiency. The efficiency score is a figure on 
the scale (0,1). The closer a bank's score is to 1, the greater its efficiency relative to 
others. 
As mentioned earlier we selected a total of 278 banks for comparison over a study 
period of 11 years. It can be safely assumed that they all, being commercial banks, have 
the same objective function and similar structural characteristics and are subject to the 
same regulatory and supervisory guidelines. 
In view of the problems of data collection associated with obtaining information on 
such variables as number of staff and staff costs, especially for the early years of the 
study horizon, we have had to settle for proxies. Our choice of inputs and outputs has 
also been influenced by the observations made from and comments received on our 
preliminary analysis. We believe that these have helped a great deal in making the model 
more suitable for assessing the efficiency of banks overtime. Gross earnings and earning 
assets3 are selected as the two outputs4 of the typical Nigerian commercial bank, while 
the inputs are total deposits, interest paid on deposits, total capital and overhead expenses. 
Overhead expenses is selected as a proxy for number of staff and staff cost. Overhead 
expenses comprise staff cost, depreciation and other administrative costs. We also 
determine that interest paid on deposits could be used as a proxy for total deposits. These 
choices of inputs reflect not only the data situation in the Nigerian banking sector but 
also the relative underdevelopment of the sector compared with those of developed 
countries. 
These outputs and inputs were used within the context of the DEA model framework 
to obtain the relative efficiency of each bank for each of the years in the period covered. 
In view of the acclaimed sensitivity of the DEA model to inclusion or removal of banks 
from the sample and also the choice of inputs and outputs, we used five models that 
differ to some extent in their choice of inputs and outputs. Table 8 gives the combination 
of inputs and outputs for each model. Each model, however, was based on the same 
sample size. 
The results of the different models are expected to provide insight into the behaviour 
of the DEA efficiency scores so as to guide the selection of the more appropriate and 
reliable models as well as examine the resulting trends in intertemporal efficiency. We 
expected that while the efficiency measures on the (0, 1) scale may differ from model to 
model, the trend over time, over banks and over models may in fact be the same or 
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Table 8: Input and output choices for five DEA models 
Model Inputs Outputs 
1 Total deposit, interest expense, 
Total capital, overhead expense 
Gross earnings, earning assets 
2 Interest expense, total capital, 
overhead expense 
Gross earnings, earning assets 
3 Interest expense, total capital, 
overhead expense 
Gross earnings 
4 Interest expense, overhead 
expense 
Gross earnings, earning assets 
5 Total deposit, interest expense, 
overhead expenses 
Gross earnings, earning assets 
similar. Where this is the case, it will make for a fundamental assessment of relative 
efficiency in the industry and for selected banks over the study horizon. The results are 
examined in the next section. 
Efficiency measures and trends in the Nigerian 
banking industry 
The average measures (scores) of technical efficiency are given in Table 9 for each year 
of the study horizon under each of the different models. These measures are obtained by 
averaging across all banks in each year. Table 9 serves a dual purpose in that it conveys 
results of significant tests (t-test) for differences in average efficiency of the banking 
sector between two consecutive periods within the study horizon. These periods are 
stated under the YEAR column with the corresponding average efficiency measures for 
the two periods stated side by side under each model. The superscript associated with the 
measures for the subsequent periods indicates the significance of the difference in average 
efficiency between the periods under comparison. The notes beneath the table explain 
further the implications of the superscripts. 
The average efficiency measures are depicted in Figure 1, which reveals the trend in 
commercial bank efficiency over the years in Nigeria. We find from the figure a somewhat 
stable level of efficiency among banks in the sector between 1983 and 1986. A major 
upward surge in industry efficiency can be observed between 1986 and 1987, presumably 
when the first impact of the economy-wide deregulation was felt within the industry. We 
recall that explicit policies incorporated in the budget of 1987, the first full year of the 
SAP, touched on the industry's activities directly. During the five-year period 1987 to 
1991, industry efficiency assumed a steady decline only to resume its first consistent 
upward trend since SAP from 1991. 
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1983 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 
Year 
Table 9: Results of t-tests of differences in efficiency for consecutive periods and models 
YEAR Eff. Score 1 Eff. Score 2 Eff. Score 3 En. Score 4 Eff. Score 5 
1983/84 0.740 0.758 0.667 0.689 0.489 0.448 0.603 0.608 0.666 0.678 
1984/85 0.758 0.741 0.689 0.689 0.449 0.609 0.619 0.678 0.674 
1985/86 0.741 0.733 0.689 0.659 0.507 0.500 0.619 0.586 0.674 0.666 
1986/87 0.733 0.765 0.659 0.696 0.500 0.531 0.586 0.609 0.666 0.705 
1987/88 0.765 0.6871 0.696 0.623' 0.531 0.542 0.609 0.5251 0.706 0.603 
1988/89 0.687 0.657 0.623 0.5471 0.542 0.4992 0.525 0.497 0.630 0.629 
1989/90 0657 0.640 0.547 0.4811 0.499 0.4672 0.497 0.4311 0.629 0.618 
1990/91 0.640 0.616 0.481 0.511 0.467 0.489 0.431 0.455 0.618 0.588 
1991/92 0.616 0.7151 0.571 0.523 0.489 0.503 0.455 0.459 0.588 0.6791 
1992/93 0.715 0.7871 0.523 0.5891 0.503 0.584' 0.459 0.500 0.679 0.7601 
I signifies that average efficiency measure significantly differs between the corresponding periods. 
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It is interesting to observe the obvious trends from each of the five different models. 
The trends for models 1, 2, 4 and 5 are particularly similat This may not be surprising 
given that our model specifications make it clear that model 4 is embedded in model 5, 
and model 2 is embedded in model 1. Model 3, we recall, is the only one in which gross 
earnings and a flow measure served as the singular output of banks. The trend, though 
different, is not particularly out of place. We can infer from the common trend across 
models and in view of the efficiency values that though the measures of efficiency may 
vary in magnitude with model, to the extent that the trend is same across models, changes 
in the magnitude of efficiency measures resulting from varying choices of model inputs 
and outputs may not necessarily make the model irrelevant and inapplicable. By this we 
are suggesting that if Bank A's efficiency measure is 0.89 and Bank B's is 0.75 under 
model A, the same conclusions about the industry could be drawn from model B which 
associates with Bank A an efficiency score of 0.55 and Bank B, an efficiency score of 
0.42. Model l's measures of efficiency are highest in magnitude followed by model 5, 
model 2, and model 4; and the lowest set of efficiency figures is from model 3. Again, 
the magnitudes are of little relevance once the trend is common. 
From Table 9 we confirm the significant decline in industry efficiency between 1987 
and 1988. All models except model 3 capture this development, though in model 5 it is 
at a 10% level of significance. Models 1, 2, 3 and 5 capture the upward surge in industry 
efficiency between 1992 and 1993. Models 1 and 2 suggest significant increase in industry 
efficiency earlier, between 1992 and 1993. Table 10 shows the results of statistical tests 
of differences in average industry efficiency before and during SAP. The graphical trend 
showed stable efficiency pre-SAP and a decline for five out of eight years of SAP. We 
find for each of the models except Model 5 that industry efficiency prior to the 
implementation of SAP was significantly different at 5% level from industry efficiency 
during SAP. Indeed, what we observe is a confirmed reduction in industry efficiency. It 
must be noted that though model 5 did not establish a significant downward decline 
during SAP compared with prior to the programme, the year by year significant tests 
shown in Table 9 indicate a significant decline at the advent of SAP between 1987 and 
1988 and significant gains in efficiency in the last two years of the programme, a 
conclusion similar to that of at least three of the other models. 
Table 10: Results of t-test of differences in banking industry efficiency pre and during 
SAP 
S/ N Efficiency measure 1983-1993 Pre-SAP SAP 
1. Measure 11 0.712 0.743 0.696 
2. Measure 21 0.603 0.677 0.567 
3. Measure 31 0.507 0.486 0.517 
4. Measure 41 0.531 0.604 0.496 
5. Measure 5 0.664 0.671 0.660 
Noof Banks 278 90 188 
The superscript 1 indicates the statistical significance of average efficiency measures between Pre-SAP and 
SAP periods. 
Assets <NSOOm 
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1983 84 
Size, capitalization, profitability, ownership and industry 
efficiency in the Nigerian commercial banking sector 
The characteristics of Nigerian commercial banks were examined in Section 1V. For a 
further exposé on industry efficiency, we sought to examine the relationship if any between 
industry efficiency and some industry characteristics such as size, capital adequacy, 
profitability and ownership. 
Bank size and efficiency 
It seems clear from the results of the statistical test of differences in average efficiency 
between banks with assets of at most N500 million and those with balance sheet figures 
in excess of N500million. Significant differences were confirmed by tests based on the 
efficiency scores of models 3,4 and 5. The proven cases of statistical significance did not 
make for consistent conclusions, however. In two of the three cases average efficiency 
of smaller banks exceeded that of the bigger banks (Table 10). Over the study period, a 
plot as in Figure 2 of average efficiency measures under model 1 illustrates the difficulty 
in concluding that bank size has anything to do with efficiency. In some years, smaller 
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banks have been more efficient and in other years bigger banks have been more efficient. 
Table 11 shows the results of a statistical comparison of the average efficiency of 
each group of banks pre and during SAR Models 2,3 and 4 suggest significant differences 
in average efficiency for smaller banks between the pre-SAP and SAP periods. Again 
the results are hardly consistent in identifying the period in which this group of banks are 
relatively more efficient. For the bigger banks, however, in all three cases (models) 
where average efficiency were found to be significantly different at 5% level, pre-SAP 
efficiency was higher than average efficiency under the SAP era. Allthough there has 
not been any consistent change in the average efficiency of smaller banks the over the 
study horizon, for bigger banks the average efficiency has declined during the SAP when 
compared with the pre-SAP era. 
Table 11: Bank capital adequacy, profitability, size and ownership - results of t-tests of 
differences in efficiency-pre and during SAP 
Variable no. of Efficiency Measures 
Variables Period category Obs Score 1 Score 2 Score 3 Score 4 Score 5 
Capital! Pre-SAP <5% 54 0.769 0.706 0.506 0.599 0.667 
asset ratio >= 5% 36 
SAP <5% 57 




0.6321 0.4571 0.613 0.677 
0.632 0.491 0.623 
0.5381 0.5001 0.499 0.6771 
Return on Pre-SAP <2% 72 0.725 0.659 0.470 0.578 0.645 
asset >= 2% 18 
SAP <2% 94 




0.7471 0.5511 0.7081 0.7751 
0.561 0.487 0.477 0.597 
0.573 0.5471 0.5161 0.723 
Asset size Pre-SAP <N500m 46 
>=N500m 44 






0.663 0.452 0.595 0.669 
0.691 0.5211 0.614 0.673 
0.587 0.504 0.537 0.692 
0.561 0.521 0.4841 0.6501 
Ownership Pre-SAP Private 19 
Govt. 71 






0.848 0.526 0.751 0.844 
0.6311 0.4762 0.5651 0.6251 
0.594 0.560 0.515 0.729 
0.5441 0.4801 0.4801 0.6001 
Note: 1 signifies the significance of the efficiency score between the categories of banks or (between 
periods) at 5% level. 
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Bank profitability and efficiency 
The profitable banks are regarded for our purpose as those with a minimum ROA of 2%. 
Those that do not meet this benchmark are referred to as less profitable banks. In all 
models except model 4, we found significant differences in the average efficiency of 
profitable and less profitable banks. Profitable banks have in all cases significantly higher 
average efficiency measures than less profitable banks. Figure 3, which plots the average 
efficiency measures of less profitable and profitable banks over the study horizon, brings 
home this distinction more vividly. 
From this graph we also observe the trend in efficiency for each group of banks. As 
with the overall industry trend exposed in earlier sections, we see a significant and 
consistent decline in the efficiency of both groups of banks from 1987 to 1991 when a 
trend reversal took place. Table 11 shows that for each group, at least three models 
confirmed the significant decline in average efficiency during the SAP era. 
It is possible to imagine that banks that are oligopolistic in nature, and hence earn 
some abnormal profit, would end up in the high efficiency category from the observed 
trend in Figure 3 between bank profitability and efficiency. Consequently, for an entirely 
competitive banking industry, the approach adopted here may fail to differentiate banks 
on the basis of efficiency. In which case, the oligopolistic situation may be presented as 
being more efficient than the competitive case. 
Among the sample banks and within the Nigerian banking system, one can think of 
the group comprising the oldest commercial banks with foreign equity and technical 
1983 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 
Year 
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involvement as being oligopolistic in nature. There are four such banks. These banks 
individually exhibit among the largest asset and deposit sizes in the industry, the lowest 
average cost of funds and the greatest proportion of deposits in current accounts (that 
are stable and cheap). They are also bankers to big blue chip companies and choice 
clientele such as embassies, airlines and other international agencies. Their age as well 
as the participation in ownership by notable foreign banks has made these possible. 
Despite this, their profits have not been abnormal in reality. On the contrary, these banks 
have been plagued with board and management instability, substantial proportion of low 
and deteriorating quality of assets, and undue interference from the majority shareholder 
(the government). In very recent years, however, with their privatization, there has been 
evidence of a major turnaround in their performance that is sure to help them maintain 
their oligopolistic status and deliver real abnormal profits! 
The new and smaller banks have not been as big but have been much more profitable 
in relative terms. Although our analysis, did not establish any clear relationship between 
size and efficiency, it did show a relationship profitability and efficiency. The monopoly 
banks did not have individual efficiency scores that were consistently higher than other 
banks. If anything, the opposite trend was observed. Clearly, our analysis does not 
present the monopoly situation as being more efficient than the competitive case. 
Bank ownership and efficiency 
A priori expectation here is that private banks will be more technically efficient than 
government banks due essentially to the fact that private banks operate strictly as profit 
maximizers while government banks may and often do serve as conduits for enforcing 
government's social responsibilities. Government banks are also thought to be plagued 
by unending bureaucracy that undermines their efficiency. In all cases, private banks 
were found to have significantly higher average efficiency than the collection of state 
and federal government banks. Figure 4 is perfectly consistent with this conclusion over 
every single year within the study horizon. Again, for both groups of banks, average 
efficiency has declined in the SAP period. A closer look at the graph shows a significant 
drop from 1987 and a trend reversal from 1991. Table 11 also confirms the observed 
significant difference and decline between the pre-SAP and SAP periods for private, 
federal and state government banks. 
Bank capital adequacy and efficiency 
Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 indicate the significance of average efficiency between banks with 
capital ratios below 5% and those with higher ratios. The test results suggest that banks 
with smaller capital ratios are more efficient than others. The plot of average efficiency 
over the study horizon for the two groups as presented in Figure 5 fails to support the test 
results. Between 1989 and 1991, for example, though the average efficiency of both 
groups of banks was on the decline, banks with higher capital ratios had higher average 
efficiency scores than others. In Table 11, though significant differences are confirmed 
to exist between both groups of banks, neither group could be said to have shown superior 
efficiency over the study period. 
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Health status classification and technical efficiency 
The appropriateness of the efficiency measures for classification of banks into the healthy 
and distressed categories is examined in this section. The regulatory authorities' concept 
of distress revolves around a bank's ability to keep consistently to its prescribed prudential 
and supervisory regulation. These include adherence, over the preceding three-month 
period, to the (1) minimum paid-up share capital, (2) risk weighted capital adequacy 
ratio, (3) sectoral credit allocation directives, (4) prudential regulations for recognition 
of low quality assets and provision for such assets, and (5) cash reserve requirements. In 
recent times, lateness in rendering statutory returns and incessant large and growing 
debit positions on a bank's account with the CBN could prompt the authorities to watchlist 
a bank as a candidate for ultimate distress. 
The regulatory authorities have also attempted to classify banks into technically and 
potentially insolvent categories, perhaps in an attempt to reflect the varying degrees of 
distress. We would imagine that such classification would make for easier identification 
of each bank's ailment to enable prompt and effective treatment. Some cases have been 
allowed to become endemic and are now proving very difficult to resolve. Others have 
displayed epileptic characteristics over time perhaps due to the authorities' inability to 
clearly and promptly identify the causal virus and give it the appropriate prescription to 
be cured. A good number of banks were known to have defaulted in huge sums in the 
inter-bank money market while others consistently carried very low liquidity ratios. Still 
others were acutely under-capitalized. The reports and statement of accounts for 1993 
of a good proportion of operating banks have not been released to date in spite of the fact 
that the statutory minimum period of six months after the financial year-end has passed. 
This fact is now being used as a guide by other banks and some informed customers on 
which banks are distressed and which can be considered healthy. This has equally guided 
us in identifying the class we define as vulnerable banks.6 
We have modified our classification of banks, though the same to a large extent 
coincides with the healthy/distressed classification. We classify as vulnerable banks 
those already classified by the CBN, those that have seen one form of CBN intervention 
or the other in recent times, and those known to be receiving treatment from the apex 
body. The latter category has as some of its members banks whose financial profiles 
have been fragile and which are yet to release their statement of accounts after the 
expiration of the statutory limit. Other banks are classified as resistant to financial 
difficulty. 
Table 12 gives information on the average efficiency measure of the different classes 
of banks for the pre-SAP and SAP periods. Two models suggest that average efficiency 
of vulnerable banks has declined significantly over the two periods. There are, however, 
cases in which average efficiency measures for vulnerable banks during the SAP era 
have exceeded those of resistant banks. The case of resistant banks has been more 
conclusive and convincing. Four out of the five models found a significant decline in the 
average efficiency of resistant banks during the SAP period. 
Three of the five models confirm the significant difference in the average efficiency 
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Table 12: Results of t-test of differences in efficiency vulnerable and resistant banks 
pre and during sap 
Efficiency Measures 
Health 
Status Period Score 1 Score 2 Score 3 Score 4 Score 5 
Vulnerable Pre-SAP 0.707 0.637 0.478 0.553 0.611 
SAP 0.675 0.575 0.500 0.484 0.617 
Resistant Pre-SAP 0.783 0.79 0.495 0.660 0.737 
SAP 0.7051 0.5631 0.525 0.5021 0.6781 
Vulnerable 0.670 0.603 0.490 0.515 0.615 
Resistant 0.7241 0.6021 0.51 71 0.541 0.692 
Efficiency Measures 
Period Health 
Status Score 1 Score 2 Score 3 Score 4 Score 5 
Pre-SAP Vulnerable 0.706 0.637 0.478 0.554 0.611 
Resistant 0.7831 0.7191 0.495 0.6601 0.737 
SAP Vulnerable 0.675 0.575 0.500 0.484 0.618 
Resistant 0.705 0.564 0.5251 0.502 0.6781 
of vulnerable and resistant banks over the study period. Resistant banks have higher 
average efficiency scores than vulnerable banks. This implies that the mean efficiency 
figures for the two categories of banks could then be used by regulatory authorities in 
conjunction with other prudential supervisory regulations such as capital adequacy to 
classify banks by their state of health. The adoption of benchmark efficiency scores for 
classifying Nigerian commercial banks by health status or strength also suggests that 
just as with early warning models of bank performance (Adekanye, 1993), there would 
be potential misciassifications. The attempt to minimize the occurrence of such 
misclassification will be informed by the precise benchmark to be adopted. This aspect 
of this study could be further pursued via discnminant and logit analysis of performance 
classification of Nigerian commercial banks. 
Managerial efficiency and DEA technical efficiency 
In the literature on bank performance, the single ratios such as operating expense to 
operating income and operating expense to total assets have been used to assess managerial 
efficiency in banks. The former considers the proportion of every naira of income spent 
on the average by a bank as a measure of the efficiency of the bank's management. The 
lower this ratio, the better the managerial efficiency of the bank. The latter ratio relates 
the expenditure of the bank (as an input) to its asset base (as a measure of its output). 
The limitation of these single ratios was emphasized earlier in this paper. 
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In this section we compare the single ratio measures of a bank's efficiency to what 
can be considered a more robust measure, the DEA technical efficiency. In a rank 
correlation analysis of the single ratio measure to the technical efficiency measures (as 
shown in Table 13), we observe for both ratios and all technical efficiency measures a 
negative correlation. We can appreciate this development from Tables 2 and 3 where 
significant increases in the single ratio measures of efficiency were observed in the SAP 
period, and Table 10 which shows significant decline in the technical efficiency of banks 
during the era of deregulation. Clearly, the single ratio measures of efficiency can hardly 
serve as proxy for the technical efficiency measures and vice versa. As Siems indicated, 
the single ratio measures are too simplistic and are devoid of sufficient information to 
capture the input-output relationship and characteristics of a typical bank in view of their 
highly aggregated nature. This result will not enable us assess the ability of the technical 
efficiency measures to distinguish the perforamce of banks, either singularly or in 
conjunction with other supervisory regulatory indicators. The basic t-test does confirm 
that the average efficiency of vulnerable commercial banks differs, however, and is indeed 
lower than that of their healthy/resistant counterparts. This at least emphasizes the 
relevance of the DEA measures of technical efficiency. 
Table 13: Rank correlation results between single ratios and DEA measures of bank efficiency 
DEA measures 
Single ratio measures 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Operating expense! 
operating income -0.378 -0.203 -0.401 -0.430 -0.560 
Operating expense! 
total assets -0.378 -0.570 -0.002 -0.621 -0.331 
Also, whereas the operating expense to operating income ratio was observed to be 
statistically significant between vulnerable and healthy banks, such a conclusion was 
not reached for the operating expense to total assets ratio. These results hardly make for 
a conclusive statement on the relevance of these single efficiency ratios. Interestingly, 
we observed from tables 5 and 10 the significance of single ratios of managerial efficiency 
as well as the DEA technical efficiency measures for distinguishing profitable from less 
profitable banks. This observation can be taken to point to the fact that although there 
may be little or no correlation between managerial and technical efficiency variables, 
this should not be taken to mean that neither could be useful as an indicator of an aspect 
of a bank's performance. The discriminant and logit models of performance can be used 
to examine the possibility of joint significance of these measures for capturing a greater 
percentage of the variation or differences in the behaviour of healthy and distressed 
banks. This is certainly an area for further study. 
VII. A two-dimensional analysis of bank 
efficiency frontier: 1983-1993 
We assume for this two dimensional analysis that each bank uses two inputs, interest 
expense and overhead expenses (as a proxy for staff costs), to produce a single output 
and gross earnings. For each bank in each year of the study period, we therefore obtain 
the two input-output ratios. The ratios for the two inputs are graphically represented in 
a two-dimensional space, so that we have on the y-axis gross earning per naira of overhead 
expense and on the x-axis, gross earning per naira of interest expense. The higher the 
coordinates for a particular bank the more efficient the bank is regarded. The efficiency 
frontier for the group of sample banks in any specific year is obtained by joining the 
outer most points so that they also cut both axes thereby "enveloping" all other points. 
The efficiency of each bank can then be assessed by measuring how far it is from the 
closest point to it on the frontier. 
In Figure 6 we produce the efficiency frontier for banks in each of the years within 
the horizon, 1983 to 1993. Each frontier is labelled to enhance identification and effective 
comparison over time. From this graph we observe that the efficiency frontier for 1983 
is largely enveloped by that of 1984. This means in 1984 an increase in output was 
observed for every naira of interest expense and overhead expense, respectively. Thus, 
banks could be said to have witnessed increased efficiency in 1984. The trend between 
1984 and 1986 is not particularly. The efficiency frontier for 1987 clearly totally envelopes 
all the frontiers between 1983 and 1986. This implies that every naira of interest and 
overhead expense (i.e., inputs), resulted in greater gross earnings (i.e., output). The frontier 
is pushed significantly toward the right compared with those of other banks. This 
significant increase in the efficiency of banks in 1987 was also observed in Figure 1 and 
confirmed by the statistical tests of differences in average efficiency of banks between 
1986 and 1987. 
The frontier for 1988 is completely enveloped by that of 1987, also reflecting a decline 
in bank efficiency over the period. The frontiers for 1988 and 1989 have lost height 
(declined along the y-axis) but gained (increased) along the x-axis. The trend is 
inconclusive since the loss has not been on both sides of the axes. The frontier for 1991 
compared with that of 1990 shows an increase in bank efficiency as it envelopes that of 
1990. The 1992 frontier overlaps slightly over that of 1991 on the x-axis showing slight 
improvements in the use of overhead expenses but reduced considerably on the y-axis. 
The frontier for 1993 envelopes that of 1990, 1991 and 1992. Following this, the efficiency 
of banks in 1993 could be said to have surpassed that recorded since 1990. 
The somewhat simplistic analysis presented in the foregoing yields a trend very similar 
to that observed from the five different efficiency models over the same period. Between 






















1983 and 1986, the changes in efficiency were not too obvious. Between 1986 and 1987, 
a sharp increase in efficiency was observed, followed by a decline. The upward trend in 
efficiency resumed in 1991, and lasted until 1993. 





VIII. Conclusions and policy 
recommendations 
Our analysis of banking system efficiency involving the comparison of pre-SAP and 
SAP efficiency of Nigerian commercial banks has yielded some interesting conclusions. 
There are indications that the efficiency of Nigerian commercial banks has tended to 
decline quite significantly during the period of deregulation compared with the period 
prior to SAR The deregulation period has seen a remarkable change in commercial 
banking efficiency as measured and perceived in this study over the last ten years in 
Nigeria. Efficiency in resource utilization was brandied quite prominently in the debate 
that preceded the introduction of SAP and it was thought that this would be reflected in 
the banking industry, which is one of those that has witnessed such transformation in 
recent years. The graphical exposition of the trend in technical efficiency of banks over 
the study period suggests that although efficiency could be said to have been rather stable 
between 1983 and 1986, it surged in 1987 the first full year of the SAP era before assuming 
a declining trend up till 1990/91. From then it appeared to have picked up. Interestingly, 
the years 1991, 1992 and 1993 are three consecutive years over which reform-oriented 
policies could be said to have been largely consistent. 
The fact that the theoretical expectation of enhanced industry efficiency was not 
realized should not be taken to imply the failure of the policy of deregulation. The fact 
that the trend over 1991 - 1993 was observed as indicated above further corroborates 
this. Between 1987 and 1990/9 1, the stream of adopted policies portrayed a fire-fighting 
approach to resolving unanticipated problems of the new policy regime. The changes in 
interest rate policy represent a good example of a policy that could have adversely affected 
the efficiency of banks. Indeed, interest expense as an input in the models adopted could 
have served as a conduit for transmitting the distortions these policies generated. It will 
be recalled that the last time the interest ceilings were reintroduced, banks were expected 
to review downward lending rates on existing facilities with immediate effect, while 
they were mandated to retain deposits until maturity at the high rates at which they were 
contracted. In this case, the system itself seemed to have been responsible for the 
perpetration of inefficiency in the sector. 
On the other hand, the inflationary effects of the huge and growing fiscal deficit as 
well as the way in which it was financed could equally have affected the efficiency 
estimates of the model through the overhead expense input, which can be expected to be 
highly positively correlated over time with the rate of inflation. This trial and error 
approach as well as the sheer scale of fiscal indiscipline run contrary to the critical success 
factors identified with the policy of deregulation and in our view are capable of 
undermining the ability of banks to enhance their efficiency during the SAP era. 
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Banks' earning assets also comprise a substantial portion of what is popularly called 
stabilization securities. These instruments have been nothing but a vehicle for shocking 
or better still jolting the sector in the regulatory authorities'so-called attempt at controlling 
industry liquidity. These securities are dreaded by banks in that their timing and volume 
cannot be predicted. They cast a bottleneck on banks' ability to manage their earning 
assets efficiently and by implication their aggregate earnings. To the extent that the 
incidence of the securities across banks cannot be said to be equal, they may explain 
differences in efficiency not only over time (since they were introduced in 1998) but also 
across banks in any particular year. 
We have also observed that private and government owned banks differ in their 
technical efficiency. The average efficiency measures are higher for private banks than 
for government banks. The distinction was significant for each group of banks between 
the pre-SAP and SAP periods. The efficiency of both categories of banks also declined 
during the SAP. Clearly, since efficiency of private banks exceeded that of government 
owned banks, it stands to reason that at least from the view point of technical efficiency- 
and subject to the limitations of our methodology- gains from privatization of banks may 
be more real than imaginary. While we may have cause to expect that privatizing 
government owned banks would enhance their efficiency, the declining trend in industry 
efficiency may be taken to suggest that given the conditions that prevailed during SAP, 
such banks may not have been spared from the band wagon effect of the decline. 
The efficiency measures derived also significantly differed between vulnerable and 
resistant banks classified here in the wisdom of the healthy/distressed classification 
adopted by regulatory authorities. Resistant banks recorded higher average technical 
efficiency than vulnerable banks. The conclusion here is that in addition to other tools 
being adopted to monitor changes in the financial condition, the efficiency measures 
could as well be adopted by regulatory authorities to identify ailing banks early enough 
or track down deterioration in efficiency before it becomes irredeemable. These efficiency 
measures may be useful as a guide to off-site examiners and supervisors for tracking the 
health status of commercial banks. The measures may not in themselves, however, capture 
the full characteristics of ailing banks in view of the fact that they hardly reflect such 
prudential regulatory prescriptions as capital adequacy, liquidity ratio, etc. To this extent, 
it is suggested that they be used in conjunction with other measures to enhance the ability 
of bank supervisors to track developments within the industry. Identification of an industry 
wide decline in efficiency may also have served to alert policy makers early enough on 
the adverse effects of their policies. 
There is an intuitively appealing argument that engaging an elaborate and costly 
optimization model as presented in this study for categorizing banks by health status is 
of littile value. This argument draws from the fact that the conclusions reached by the 
model appear to support the classification used by the supervisory authorities, which is 
much less rigorous in application. Such an argument appears very restrictive, however, 
and somewhat detracts from the usefulness of the approach and results obtained in this 
study. This is for at least two reasons. 
First, the CAMEL-driven approach as adopted by the supervisory authorities is unable 
to rank banks by degree of deterioration in health at any point in time or over any given 
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period. The approaches that rely on quantitative measures are better able to capture this 
important and critical need, for safety, soundness and public confidence in the sector to 
be consistently preserved. 
Second, the basic CAMEL rating, in spite of its wide acceptability and usage, 
has in practice been complemented by quantitative early warning models. This makes 
for a more comprehensive understanding of bank performance, changes in bank behaviour, 
and the effect of specific policies or a menu of policies on the banking sector. Clearly, 
this is in recognition of the inadequacy of CAMEL and the value-added that can be 
derived from the adoption of more rigorous quantitative models. 
Notes 
The term deregulation has been used in this study to imply the period of consistent 
(or near-consistent) implementation of reform policies in the Nigerian economy. 
We recognize that so far at no time can the Nigerian economy be said to be de- 
regulated. The approach has been haphazard and characterized by largely incon- 
sistent policies though the more recent periods have witnessed greater consis- 
tency in the use of some reform policies. 
2. See Siems (1992) and Yue (1992) for a more detailed mathematical and graphical 
exposition of the DEA methodology. Wheelock and Wilson (1994) also serves as 
an excellent reference. 
3. One notable weakness in the choice of earning assets in the DEA model used in 
this study derives from the fact that it is stated net of provision for loan loss and 
other poor quality assets. Prior to 1991, the standards used to determine the mag- 
nitude for provisions differed considerably across banks and many, as was later 
recognized, made inadequate provisions for their poor quality assets. Hence, effi- 
ciency of a bank in this sense may simply reflect such under provisions and by 
implication overstatement of the output for a given level of inputs. What makes 
the series nonetheless useful is that to a very large extent, virtually all banks made 
inadequate provisions. Only in relative terms were there differences. 
4. The note made about the tendency to overstate the maginitude of gross earnings 
by banks before the introduction of the prudential guidelines in 1991 has implica- 
tions for gross earnings. This is because both the interest on loans that are bad 
will be incorporated in the profit and loss account, thereby also overstating the 
value of gross earnings. Again, this has been the case with virtually all banks. 
This tendency has been greatly reduced during the 1990s. 
5. We have not checked on the sensitivity of the DEA efficiency measures to changes 
in number of banks and over time in this study. This would involve computing the 
efficiency measures over much shorter subperiods rather than pooling over many 
years as we have done here. By computing the efficiency measures on an annual 
basis, for example the number of banks included would have changed and the 
effect of this could be assessed. The sensitivty of the methodology to the choice 
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of inputs and outputs can be determined from the results of other models adopted 
in this study. 
6. In the more recent periods of the study, we excluded banks that are yet to release 
their annual reports. Data on the financial condition of such banks were used in 
the earlier periods for which they were available and during which the banks were 
perhaps yet to be classified as distressed. 
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